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While Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) and their multi-agent
extension Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs) provide a natural and systematic
approach to modeling sequential decision making problems under uncertainty, the
computational complexity with which the solutions are computed is known to be
prohibitively expensive.
In this paper, we show how such high computational resource requirements can be
alleviated through the use of symmetries present in the problem. The problem of ﬁnding
the symmetries can be cast as a graph automorphism (GA) problem on a graphical
representation of the problem. We demonstrate how such symmetries can be exploited in
order to speed up the solution computation and provide computational complexity results.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) have been a classical mathematical framework for sequential decision making prob-
lems, in which the agent must make action decisions based on environment states. The number of steps at which the agent
can make decisions can either be ﬁnite or inﬁnite, leading to ﬁnite-horizon and inﬁnite-horizon problems, respectively.
However, although computationally tractable, MDPs have often been shown inadequate to successfully model the agent’s
noisy perception of the environment state. In order to incorporate the uncertainty about the state perception inherent in
the agent, an extended formalism called Partially Observable MDPs (POMDPs) has emerged [12,34,31].
POMDPs provide a model for single-agent sequential decision making under state uncertainty thus turning the decision
making problem into one of planning [12]. Different from MDPs, POMDPs do not provide the agent with full observability
of the states. Instead, the agent must infer which state it is in based on the noisy observations. This results in deﬁning a
probability distribution over the states, deﬁned as a belief state, to represent the uncertainty of the states. With this single
extra assumption, the computational complexity of solving a POMDP problem jumps from P-complete (MDP) to PSPACE-
complete even for ﬁnite-horizon POMDPs [23]. Solving inﬁnite-horizon POMDPs is known to be undecidable [17].
There has been a lot of work on alleviating this intractability by means of computing approximate solutions. One of
the most well-known works that shows both practicality and theoretical guarantees is Point-Based Value Iteration (PBVI)
by Pineau et al. [25]. PBVI proceeds by sampling reachable belief states according to various heuristics in order to avoid
the curse of dimensionality induced by the continuous nature of the belief states. The value backups are performed only on
those sampled belief states before collecting additional belief states. The main factor that determines the performance of
PBVI is the belief point selection heuristic. The heuristics used are intended to capture the reachability of the belief points,
thereby avoiding unnecessary computation on unreachable beliefs. One popular heuristic used is the Greedy Error Reduction
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point-based methods, because value computation is performed on a ﬁnite set of belief states, often called belief points.1
Heuristic Search Value Iteration (HSVI) by Smith and Simmons [30] is another point-based method that approximates
the value function via heuristic exploration of belief states. It maintains an upper- and a lower-bound for the true value
function, and decreases the bound gaps by recursively selecting belief states. The upper bound is initialized at the corners
of the belief simplex and is maintained as a point set. Update to this bound is performed by adding a new belief point,
whose value is computed as a projection onto a convex hull formed by belief-value pairs. The lower bound is a vector set,
meaning that the value is updated at the newly added belief, much like the updates performed in PBVI. The belief point to
be added is selected by a depth-ﬁrst search from the initial belief.
Another approach by which the intractability of the POMDP solution can be eased (in a practical manner) is to take
advantage of the structural regularities present in POMDPs. One popular method uses the concept of homomorphism to
reduce the state space itself, thereby forming an equivalent model with a potentially much smaller size. This technique,
often called model minimization, has been extensively studied in the MDP domain, making use of stochastic bisimulation of
the states. Informally, bisimilar states can be grouped together to form a smaller state space than the original MDP, yet
the optimal policies of the original and the reduced MDP are directly related with each other. The structural characteristics
that allow for state grouping are reward equivalence and block transition equivalence. The former property states that the
states in a group should yield the same reward for any given action, and the latter that grouped states should have the
same transition probability into the group of original destination states. It is known that the optimal policy of the reduced
MDP can be lifted to be converted into the optimal policy of the original MDP, hence model reduction results in less
computation [8,10].
A different structural feature that is of interest to us is automorphism. An automorphism of a model is a homomorphism
to itself. By ﬁnding the automorphisms, or symmetries, present in the model, one may expect to reduce possibly redundant
computation performed on the symmetric portion of the solution space. It is this feature that we propose to use on POMDPs
in order to reduce computational resources needed for computing optimal solutions. In particular, we are interested in the
POMDP symmetry that is not related to reducing the size of the model, but can nonetheless be exploited to speed up
conventional point-based POMDP algorithms introduced above.
The subject of symmetry in sequential decision making has not been carried out actively, with a few exceptions: Ravin-
dran and Barto [26] were the ﬁrst to extend the model minimization method to cover symmetries in MDPs. More recently,
Narayanamurthy and Ravindran [20] constructively proved that the problem of ﬁnding symmetries in MDPs belongs to the
complexity class graph isomorphism-complete (GI-complete). In this latter work, the authors use a graph-based encoding of
the MDP to cast the problem of ﬁnding MDP symmetries to that of graph automorphism (GA). Our work is similar to this,
in that we also reduce the problem to discovering GA, but provides a simpler and more intuitive approach along with a
practical guide to applying symmetries to existing algorithms. We also extend the domain to multi-agent settings.
Another work similar to ours is that of permutable POMDPs by Doshi and Roy [9]. This work was presented in the
context of preference elicitation where the belief states have permutable state distribution. Similarly to the approach we
present, this permutable POMDP framework is based on the idea that the value functions of certain classes of POMDPs are
permutable with respect to the state permutation. That is, the components of the value function can be permuted according
to the permutation of their corresponding states while maintaining value invariance. While the overall idea is in league with
our approach, there are two important differences. First, the permutable POMDP only considers a speciﬁc type of symmetry
that can be found in preference elicitation problems and models similar to them. More speciﬁcally, they show how certain
preference elicitation problems can be set up to exhibit symmetric properties. That is, they ﬁrst provide certain conditions
a state permutation should satisfy and show how a preference elicitation POMDP can have its parameters set in order to
satisfy the stated conditions. As opposed to such setting, our research aims to provide an algorithmic framework with which
symmetries can be discovered and exploited in general POMDP problems. Second, their symmetry deﬁnition requires that
the equality condition hold for all n! permutations, where n is the number of states. This is a very strict condition, and is
therefore suitable for only a very limited set of problems. On the other hand, our formulation relaxes this restriction by
considering the state, action, and observation permutations in groups.
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs) are a multi-agent extension to the POMDPs, where the actions and obser-
vations now take a collective form of all agents. This change induces another leap in the complexity hierarchy: planning in
ﬁnite-horizon Decentralized POMDPs (DEC-POMDPs), which is a special class of POSGs with common payoffs, is known to
be NEXP-complete [3]. Planning in inﬁnite-horizon DEC-POMDP is again undecidable since DEC-POMDPs is a generalization
of POMDPs. Hansen et al. [11] give an exact algorithm for solving POSGs, by means of Multi-Agent Dynamic Programming
(MADP). MADP performs dynamic programming backups over an extended, multi-agent belief space, which is a distribution
over both the latent state and the policies of other agents. In order to keep memory usage in check, the notion of dominance
is used to prune unnecessary intermediate solutions at each iteration.
In this paper, as an extended version of our previous work [13], we extend the algorithm to that of exploiting symmetries
for POSGs as well. In particular, we will show how the notion of symmetries can be extended to a multi-agent case and
how it affects some of the game-theoretic concepts in POSGs.
1 In the sequel, we use the terms “belief points” and “belief states” interchangeably.
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Before we present our main results and algorithms in detail, we ﬁrst review the preliminaries of formal models for the
single- and multi-agent sequential decision making problems in partially observable environments used in this paper. We
also deﬁne optimal solutions for the models and representations for these solutions.
2.1. POMDPs
The partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [12] is a model for sequential decision making problems in single
agent settings. It is a generalization of the MDP model that relaxes the assumption that the agent has complete information
about the environment states.
Formally, a POMDP is deﬁned as a tuple 〈S, A, Z , T , O , R,b0〉, where
• S is the set of environment states,
• A is the set of actions available to the agent,
• Z is the set of all possible observations,
• T : S × A × S → [0,1] is the transition function with T (s,a, s′) = P (s′|s,a) denoting the probability of changing to state
s′ from state s by executing action a,
• O : S × A × Z → [0,1] is the observation function with O (s,a, z) = P (z|s,a) denoting the probability of making obser-
vation z when executing action a and arriving in state s,
• R : S× A →  is the reward function where R(s,a) denotes the immediate reward received by the agent when executing
action a in state s,
• b0 is the initial state distribution with b0(s) denoting the probability that the environment starts in state s.
Since the agent cannot directly observe the states, it has to consider the history of its past actions and observations to
decide the current action. The history at time t is deﬁned as
ht = {a0, z1,a1, z2, . . . ,at−1, zt}.
The action is determined by a policy π , which is a function that maps from the histories to actions. For ﬁnite-horizon
problems, where we assume that the agent can execute actions for a ﬁnite time steps, the policy can be represented using
a policy tree, where each node is labeled with the action to execute, and each edge is labeled with the observation that the
agent can receive at each time step. Following an observation edge, the agent faces the next level subtree, whose root node
speciﬁes the action to execute at the next time step. The sequence of action nodes and observation edges traversed while
executing the policy naturally becomes the history.
The history leads to the deﬁnition of a belief state, which is the probability distribution on the states given the history of
actions and observations:
bt(s) = P (st = s|ht,b0).
Upon executing action at and receiving observation zt+1, the belief state bt+1 = τ (bt ,at, zt+1) at the next time step is
computed by the Bayes rule:
bt+1
(
s′
)= O (s′,at, zt+1)∑s∈S T (s,at , s′)bt(s)
P (zt+1|bt,at) ,
where
P (zt+1|bt,at) =
∑
s′∈S
O
(
s′,at , zt+1
)∑
s∈S
T
(
s,at , s
′)bt(s).
The belief state bt constitutes a suﬃcient statistic for history ht , and can be represented as an |S|-dimensional vector. We
can thus re-deﬁne the policy as a mapping from belief states to actions.
The value of a policy is the expected discounted sum of rewards by following the policy starting from a certain belief
state. The optimal value function is the one obtained by following an optimal policy, and can be deﬁned recursively: given
the (t − 1)-step optimal value function, the t-step optimal value function is deﬁned as
V ∗t (b) = maxa
[
R(b,a) + γ
∑
z∈Z
P (z|b,a)V ∗t−1
(
τ (b,a, z)
)]
(1)
where R(b,a) =∑s b(s)R(s,a) and γ ∈ [0,1) is the discount factor.
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The partially observable stochastic game (POSG) [3,11] is an extension of the POMDP framework to multi-agent settings.
More formally, a POSG with n agents is deﬁned as a tuple 〈I, S,b0, {Ai}, {Zi}, T , O , {Ri}〉, where
• I is the ﬁnite set of agents indexed 1, . . . ,n.
• S is the ﬁnite set of environment states.
• b0 is the initial state distribution where b0(s) is the probability that the environment starts in state s.
• Ai is the ﬁnite set of actions available to agent i. Also, the set of joint actions is speciﬁed as 	A =∏i∈I Ai .
• Zi is the ﬁnite set of observations available to agent i. Similarly, the set of joint observations is deﬁned as 	Z =∏i∈I Zi .• T is the transition function where T (s, 	a, s′) = P (s′|s, 	a), the probability of resulting in state s′ when executing joint
action 	a in state s.
• O is the observation function where O (s, 	a, 	z) = P (	z|	a, s), the probability of making joint observation 	z when executing
joint action 	a and arriving in state s.
• Ri is the individual reward function where Ri(s, 	a) denotes the reward (payoff) received by agent i when joint action 	a
is executed in state s.
If we restrict every agent to share the same individual reward function, the model becomes the Decentralized POMDP
(DEC-POMDP) [3].
In POSGs, each agent independently makes its own decision based on the local information available to the agent. The
local information at time t for agent i can be represented as the local history
hi,t = {ai,0, zi,1,ai,1, zi,2, . . . ,ai,t−1, zi,t}
where actions ai,∗ and observations zi,∗ are from the set Ai and Zi , respectively. The local policy (i.e., strategy) πi executed
by agent i is then essentially a mapping from the local histories to local actions. A joint policy is a set of local policies for
each agent. Algorithms for POSGs ﬁnd the joint policy, which is the set of local policies 	π = {π1, . . . ,πn} for each agent, for
solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium or correlated equilibrium. In the case of DEC-POMDPs where the agents have to
cooperate, the algorithms search for the optimal joint policy that maximizes the expected sum of rewards over the planning
horizon.
The agents in POSGs have to reason about other agents’ policies as well as the true state, since they collectively affect
the rewards and the state transitions, and hence the value. This leads to the deﬁnition of multi-agent belief state, which is a
probability distribution over the hidden states and other agents’ policies [19]. Hence, while dynamic programming methods
for POMDPs involve belief states and value vectors deﬁned only over the system states, methods for POSGs involve multi-
agent belief states and value vectors deﬁned over the joint space of the states and other agents’ policies. Thus, for each
policy π ∈ Πi of agent i, there exists a value vector V πi of dimension |S|| 	Π−i |, where 	Π−i is the set of policies for all other
agents except agent i. In this paper, we focus on ﬁnite-horizon problems, and assume the local policy is represented as a
decision tree.
Formally, agent i’s t-step value function of executing policy π while others are executing policy 	π−i can be deﬁned as
V πi,t(s, 	π−i) = Ri(s, 	a 	π ) + γ
∑
	z∈	Z
O (s, 	a 	π , 	z)
∑
s′∈S
T
(
s, 	a 	π , s′
)
V π(zi)i,t−1
(
s′, 	π−i(	z−i)
)
(2)
where 	π = {π, 	π−i} is the joint policy formed by π for agent i and 	π−i for other agents, 	a 	π is the joint action for the
current time step prescribed by the policy 	π , π(zi) is the (t − 1)-step local policy for agent i after observation of zi , and
	π−i(	z−i) is the (t − 1)-step joint policy for other agents after observation of 	z−i . For a given multi-agent belief state bi , the
agent i’s value of executing local policy π is deﬁned as
V πi,t(bi) =
∑
s∈S
∑
	π−i∈ 	Π−i
bi(s, 	π−i)V πi,t(s, 	π−i). (3)
3. Solution methods
In this section, we brieﬂy review some important solution techniques for POMDPs and POSGs. There exists a wealth
of literature presenting various algorithms on this matter, but in this paper, we only discuss point-based value iteration
(PBVI) [25] for POMDPs and multi-agent dynamic programming (MADP) [11] for POSGs, which will be discussed in the later
sections.
3.1. PBVI for POMDPs
The deﬁnition of the optimal value function in Eq. (1) leads to a dynamic programming update to obtain the t-step
optimal value function V ∗t from the (t − 1)-step optimal value function V ∗t−1. The dynamic programming update could be
represented as a backup operator H on the value functions, such that given a belief state b,
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The PBVI algorithm.
Require: Binit (initial set of belief states), K (maximum number of belief state expansions), and T (maximum number of backups)
B = Binit
Γ = {}
for k = 1, . . . , K do
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Γ = BACKUP(B,Γ )
end for
Bnew = EXPAND(B,Γ )
B = B ∪ Bnew
end for
Return Γ
Vt(b) = HVt−1(b) = max
a
[
R(b,a) + γ
∑
z∈Z
P (z|a,b)Vt−1
(
τ (b,a, z)
)]
.
Since belief states provide a suﬃcient statistic for the histories, they can be treated as states in a continuous MDP, namely
the belief state MDP. One shortcoming of this approach is that the belief state is continuous, and so we cannot simply use
tabular representation for value functions as in discrete state space MDPs, hence naively performing the backup operation
for every possible belief state becomes intractable. However, Sondik [31] pointed out that the value function for each horizon
t can be represented by a set Γt = {α0, . . . ,αm} of α-vectors, so that the value at a particular belief state b is calculated as:
Vt(b) = max
α∈Γt
∑
s∈S
α(s)b(s).
The construction of Γt is carried out via a series of intermediate Γ generation:
Γ
a,∗
t =
{
αa,∗
∣∣ αa,∗(s) = R(s,a)},
Γ
a,z
t =
{
αa,zi
∣∣∣ αa,zi (s) = γ ∑
s′∈S
T
(
s,a, s′
)
O
(
s′,a, z
)
αi
(
s′
)
, ∀αi ∈ Γt−1
}
,
Γ at = Γ a,∗t +
⊕
z∈Z
Γ
a,z
t ,
Γt =
⋃
a∈A
Γ at ,
where the cross-sum operator ⊕ on sets A and B is deﬁned as:
A ⊕ B = {a+ b | ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
However, |Γt | can be in the order of O (|A||Γt−1||Z |) in the worst case, leading to a very high computational cost. The
doubly exponential growth of |Γt | in t can be alleviated by pruning dominated α-vectors for all possible belief states, but
the effect of pruning is limited in practice. This is mainly due to the fact that the backup is done over all possible belief
states. Point-based value iteration (PBVI) [25] attempts to limit this growth by performing backups only on a ﬁnite set B of
reachable belief states. Hence, in ﬁnding Γt for Vt , PBVI constructs Γ
a,b
t , ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B , whose elements are calculated by
Γ
a,b
t =
{
αab
∣∣∣ αab(s) = R(s,a) +∑
z∈Z
[
argmax
α∈Γ a,zt
(α · b)
]
(s)
}
and ﬁnally compute the best action for each belief state
Γ Bt =
{
α
∣∣ α = argmax
a∈A,αab∈Γ a,bt
(
αab · b
)
, ∀b ∈ B
}
.
Using Γt (or Γ Bt as an approximation) for Vt , the policy simply takes the form of choosing the action associated with
argmaxα∈Γt (α · b). Table 1 outlines PBVI. The BACKUP routine refers to the process of creating Γ Bt , described above. The
EXPAND routine characterizes the heuristic aspect of PBVI, whose task is to collect reachable belief states from the given
set B of beliefs. Heuristics for EXPAND include: greedy error reduction, where the belief states that reduce the expected error
bound are greedily chosen, and stochastic simulation with explorative action, where the belief states that mostly reduce the
maximum distance among sampled belief states are greedily chosen. In later sections, we will modify the BACKUP routine
in order to exploit the symmetries in POMDPs.
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Hansen et al. [11] propose a multi-agent dynamic programming (MADP) algorithm for POSGs. The dynamic programming
update in MADP consists of two stages, ﬁrst enumerating t-step policies from (t − 1)-step policies and evaluating these
policies to obtain value functions, and then eliminating policies that are not useful for any multi-agent belief state.
Note that the multi-agent value function in Eq. (3) was represented as the set of |S|| 	Π−i|-dimensional vectors. While
the dynamic programming methods for POMDPs, such as PBVI, involve belief states and value vectors deﬁned only over
the environment states, the methods for POSGs involve multi-agent belief states and value vectors deﬁned over the joint
space of environment states and other agents’ policies. Hence the dimension of value vectors will vary whenever a policy is
eliminated in the second stage of dynamic programming update. A more convenient way to represent the value is to prepare
a value vector for each joint policy 	π ∈ 	Πt , so that the state value vectors and belief vectors be of a ﬁxed dimension |S|:
V 	πi,t(s) = Ri
(
s, 	a 	π
)+ γ ∑
	z∈	Z
O
(
s, 	a 	π , 	z
)∑
s′∈S
T
(
s, 	a 	π , s′
)
V 	π(	z)i,t−1
(
s′
)
. (4)
The corresponding value function for a speciﬁc belief b ∈ [0,1]|S| is:
V 	πi,t(b) =
∑
s∈S
b(s)V 	πi,t(s). (5)
Notice that given Eq. (2), we can convert it into Eq. (4) by concatenating 	π−i and π to construct the joint policy 	π . Also,
given a joint policy, a state belief vector of dimension |S| can be computed for any horizon t based on the given initial
state distribution b0 and the action/observation history up to time t . Thus, Eq. (3) can be represented as Eq. (5). We will
use Eq. (5) to represent the value for the rest of the section, for ease of exposition.
Given the set 	Πt−1 = Π1,t−1 × · · · × Πi,t−1 × · · · × Πn,t−1 of (t − 1)-step joint policies and the value vectors V 	πi,t−1
for all 	π ∈ 	Πt−1, the ﬁrst stage of the dynamic programming update exhaustively generates Πi,t using Πi,t−1 for each
agent i, which is the set of t-step local policies for agent i. Assuming tree representations for policies, the t-step local
policy for agent i can be created by preparing |Ai | root action nodes, and appending all possible combinations of (t − 1)-
step local policies to the observation edges of the root action node. The number of exhaustively generated t-step local
policies will be |Πi,t | = |Ai ||Πi,t−1||Zi | . Combining Πi,t for all the agents yields the set of t-step joint policies 	Πt with size
|Π1,t ||Π2,t | · · · |Πi,t | · · · |Πn,t |. The ﬁrst stage of dynamic programming update is concluded by computing the values of joint
policies, V 	πi,t for all 	π ∈ 	Πt and agent i, using Eq. (5).
With all the necessary policy backup and value computation completed, the update continues to the second stage, where
the very weakly dominated policies are pruned. A local policy π of agent i is said to be weakly dominated if the agent does
not decrease its value by switching to some other local policy while all others maintain their own local policies, and there
exists at least one 	π−i ∈ 	Π−i,t such that switching away from π strictly increases agent i’s value. A very weakly dominated
policy is one where the weak dominance relation holds without the existence requirement of the strict improvement in the
value. The test for very weak dominance of a local policy π of agent i can be determined by checking the existence of a
probability distribution p on other policies Πi,t\π such that∑
π ′∈Πi,t\π
p
(
π ′
)
V
{π ′, 	π−i}
i,t (s) V
{π, 	π−i}
i,t (s), ∀s ∈ S, ∀ 	π−i ∈ 	Π−i,t, (6)
where V {π, 	π−i}i,t is the value vector of the joint policy formed by π for agent i and 	π−i for other agents. If there exists
such a distribution, then π is prunable since it is possible for agent i to take a stochastic policy determined by p, while
achieving the value no worse than that of π . This test for dominance is carried out by linear programming (LP). A very
weakly dominated policy can thus be safely pruned without any concern for the loss in value. The pruning proceeds in
an iterated fashion where each agent alternately tests for dominance and prunes accordingly. This iteration stops when no
agent can prune any more local policies.
Table 2 outlines the MADP algorithm for computing the set of T -step joint policies. Note that this algorithm requires
additional computation to select the joint policy depending on the solution concept such as Nash equilibrium. For DEC-
POMDPs that assume cooperative settings, a joint policy with the maximum value for the initial state distribution b0 is
selected as an optimal joint policy.
4. Symmetries in POMDPs and POSGs
In this section, we show how symmetries are deﬁned in POMDPs and POSGs. We show that ﬁnding symmetries for
botch cases is a graph isomorphism complete (GI-complete) problem – the complexity class of ﬁnding automorphisms in
general graphs. We present the graph encoding of a given POMDP and POSG in order to apply algorithms for ﬁnding graph
automorphisms. We also describe how POMDP and POSG algorithms can be extended to exploit the symmetries discovered
in the models.
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The MADP algorithm.
Require: Πi,0 =∅ and Vi,0 = {	0} (initial value function) for each agent i.
for t = 1, . . . , T do
# The ﬁrst stage of dynamic programming backup
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
Perform backup on (t − 1)-step local policies Πi,t−1 to produce the exhaustive set of t-step local policies Πi,t .
end for
Let 	Πt = Π1,t × · · · × Πi,t × · · · × Πn,t .
for all 	π ∈ 	Πt do
Compute V 	πi,t (Eq. (5)) and add the value vector to Vi,t .
end for
# The second stage of dynamic programming backup
repeat
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
for all π ∈ Πi,t do
Prune π if very weakly dominated (Eq. (6))
end for
end for
until no local policy was pruned in the loop
end for
return Sets of T -step policies Πi,T and corresponding value vectors Vi,T for each agent i
4.1. Deﬁnition of symmetries in POMDPs
There have been a number of works in the past to take advantage of the underlying structure in decision theoretic plan-
ning models. Perhaps one of the most extensively studied types of structural regularities would be that of homomorphism.
It is directly related to abstraction and model minimization techniques that try to reduce the size of the model.
A homomorphism φ of a POMDP is deﬁned as 〈φS , φA, φZ 〉 where φS : S → S ′ is the function that maps the states, φA :
A → A′ maps the actions, and φZ : Z → Z ′ maps the observations. Note that the mapped POMDP M ′ = 〈S ′, A′, Z ′, T ′, O ′, R ′〉
is a reduced model of M if any of the mappings is many-to-one. Because of this property, model minimization methods for
POMDPs search for a homomorphism φ that maps M to an equivalent POMDP M ′ with the minimal model size. Depending
on the deﬁnition of homomorphism φ, we obtain different deﬁnitions of the minimal model.
A simple extension of MDP model minimization [10] to POMDPs leads to a homomorphism φ of form 〈φS ,1,1〉, where 1
denotes the identity mapping. In order to hold equivalence between M and M ′ , φS should satisfy the following constraints:
T ′
(
φS(s),a, φS
(
s′
))= ∑
s′′∈φ−1S (s′)
T
(
s,a, s′′
)
,
R ′
(
φS(s),a
)= R(s,a),
O ′
(
φS(s),a, z
)= O (s,a, z).
Pineau et al. [24] extend the approach to the case when a task hierarchy is given by an expert, and they achieve a further
reduction in the state space since some of the actions become irrelevant under the task hierarchy.
Wolfe [36] extends the minimization method to compute homomorphism of a more general form 〈φS , φA, φZ 〉 where the
observation mapping φZ can change depending on the action. The constraints for the equivalence are given by:
T ′
(
φS(s),φA(a),φS
(
s′
))= ∑
s′′∈φ−1S (s′)
T
(
s,a, s′′
)
,
R ′
(
φS(s),φA(a)
)= R(s,a),
O ′
(
φS(s),φA(a),φ
a
Z (z)
)= O (s,a, z).
Note that the above methods are interested in ﬁnding many-to-one mappings in order to ﬁnd a model with reduced size.
Hence, they focus on computing partitions of the state, action, and observation spaces of which blocks represent aggregates
of equivalent states, actions, and observations, respectively. Once the partitions are found, we can employ conventional
POMDP algorithms on the abstract POMDP with reduced number of states, actions, or observations, which in effect reduces
the computational complexities of algorithms.
In this paper, we are interested in automorphism, which is a special class of homomorphism:
Deﬁnition 1. An automorphism φ is deﬁned as 〈φS , φA, φZ 〉 where the state mapping φS : S → S , the action mapping
φA : A → A, and the observation mapping φZ : Z → Z are all one-to-one mappings satisfying:
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s′ = sLEFT sRIGHT sLEFT sRIGHT sLEFT sRIGHT
s = sLEFT 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
s = sRIGHT 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fig. 1. Transition probabilities of the tiger domain.
O (s,aLISTEN, z) O (s,aLEFT, z) O (s,aRIGHT, z)
z = zLEFT zRIGHT zLEFT zRIGHT zLEFT zRIGHT
s = sLEFT 0.85 0.15 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
s = sRIGHT 0.15 0.85 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fig. 2. Observation probabilities of the tiger domain.
R(s,a)
a = aLISTEN aLEFT aRIGHT
s = sLEFT −1 −100 10
s = sRIGHT −1 10 −100
Fig. 3. Reward function of the tiger domain.
T
(
s,a, s′
)= T (φS(s),φA(a),φS(s′)),
O (s,a, z) = O (φS(s),φA(a),φZ (z)),
R(s,a) = R(φS(s),φA(a)).
Hence, φ maps the original POMDP to itself, and there is no assumption regarding the reduction in the size of the model.
The classic tiger domain [12] is perhaps one of the best examples to describe automorphisms in POMDPs. The state
space S of the tiger domain is deﬁned as {sLEFT, sRIGHT}, representing the state of the world when the tiger is behind the
left door or the right door, respectively. The action space A is deﬁned as {aLEFT,aRIGHT,aLISTEN}, representing actions for
opening the left door, opening the right door, or listening, respectively. The observation space Z is deﬁned as {zLEFT, zRIGHT}
representing hearing the sound of the tiger from the left door or the right door, respectively. The speciﬁcations of transition
probabilities, observation probabilities, and the rewards are as given in Figs. 1, 2, and 3. The initial belief is given as
b0(sLEFT) = b0(sRIGHT) = 0.5.
Note that the tiger domain is already compact in the sense that minimization methods previously mentioned cannot
reduce the size of the model: examining the reward function alone, we cannot aggregate aLEFT and aRIGHT since the rewards
are different depending on the current state being either sLEFT or sRIGHT. By a similar argument, we cannot reduce the state
space nor the observation space.
However, sLEFT and sRIGHT can be interchanged to yield an equivalent POMDP, while simultaneously changing the corre-
sponding actions and observations:
φS(s) =
{
sRIGHT if s = sLEFT,
sLEFT if s = sRIGHT,
φA(a) =
{
aLISTEN if a = aLISTEN,
aRIGHT if a = aLEFT,
aLEFT if a = aRIGHT,
φZ (z) =
{
zRIGHT if z = zLEFT,
zLEFT if z = zRIGHT.
Furthermore, this property yields symmetries in the belief states and α-vectors in the tiger domain, as can be seen
in Fig. 4.
The automorphism in POMDPs is the type of regularity we intend to discover and exploit in this paper: the symmetry
in the model that does not necessarily help the model minimization algorithm further reduce the size of the model. Hence,
rather than computing partitions, we focus on computing all possible automorphisms of the original POMDP.
Note that if the original POMDP can be reduced in size, we can have exponentially many automorphisms in the number
of blocks in the partition. For example, if the model minimization yields a state partition with K blocks of 2 states each,
the number of automorphisms becomes 2K . Hence, it is advisable to compute automorphism after we compute the minimal
model of POMDP.
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symmetric. The same argument applies to b2 and b4. Although the illustration uses an approximate value function computed by PBVI, the value function
from exact methods will show the same phenomenon.
4.2. Properties of symmetries in POMDPs
As shown in the tiger domain, the automorphisms of POMDPs reveal the symmetries present in belief states and α-
vectors; given a POMDP M with automorphism φ = 〈φS , φA, φZ 〉, let Γ ∗ be the set of α-vectors for the optimal value
function. In this setting, we provide the following two theorems that can be exploited when computing a solution to a
given POMDP.
By a slight abuse of notation, for a vector v of dimension |S|, we let φS(v) be the transformed vector whose elements
are permuted by φS .
Theorem 1. If b is a reachable belief state, then φS(b) is also a reachable belief state.
Proof. First, given φ = 〈φS , φA, φZ 〉, note that
baz(s) = bφA(a)φZ (z)
(
φS(s)
)
,
because the automorphism ensures that T (s,a, s′) = T (φS (s),φA(a),φS(s′)) and O (s,a, z) = O (φS (s),φA(a),φZ (z)). This
means that the symmetric image of a reachable belief vector b, that is, φS(b), is also reachable from the initial belief
b0 by executing a “symmetric policy”, where the action a is mapped to φA(a).
In other words, if b is reachable from initial belief state b0 by executing a policy tree, φS(b) can also be reached by
executing the policy tree where action nodes are relabeled using φA(a) and the observation edges are relabeled using
φZ (z). 
Theorem 2. If α ∈ Γ ∗ , then φS(α) ∈ Γ ∗ .
Proof. We prove by induction on horizon t in Γt . By the deﬁnition of automorphism, R(s,a) = R(φS (s),φA(a)). Hence, if
α ∈ Γ0 then φS(α) ∈ Γ0.
Suppose that the argument holds for Γt−1. This implies that ∀α ∈ Γ a,zt , φS(α) ∈ Γ φA(a),φZ (z)t by the deﬁnition of Γ a,zt . If
α ∈ Γt , then by deﬁnition, for some a and b,
α(s) = αab(s) = R(s,a) +
∑
z∈Z
argmax
α′∈Γ a,zt
(
α′ · b).
Consider its symmetric image deﬁned as
α
(
φS(s)
)= R(φS(s),φA(a))+ ∑
φZ (z)∈Z
argmax
α′′∈Γ φA (a),φZ (z)t
(
α′′ · φS(b)
)
.
For each observation φZ (z), the argmax will select α′′ which is the symmetric image of α′ selected in the argmaxα′∈Γ a,zt (α
′ ·
b). Hence we have φS(α) ∈ Γt . 
In this work, we specialize the PBVI algorithm to exploit symmetries, as will be shown in later sections. However,
the theorems we provide are general enough to be applied to a variety of different value function-based algorithms. We
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{a1,LISTEN,a2,LISTEN} 0 1 0 1
Other 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fig. 5. State transition probabilities of the Dec-Tiger domain. The second row shows the transition probabilities of all joint actions composed of at least one
non-listen individual action.
argue so, because the unifying theme of all value function-based algorithms is the dependence on α-vectors and/or belief
points, and the two theorems we presented indicate that the symmetric images of the sampled belief points and α-vectors
contribute equivalently to the overall value. For example, the randomized point-based backup of Perseus [32] can beneﬁt
from our results by not having to perform redundant backup operation on symmetric beliefs. Symmetries can be exploited
in search based methods such as HSVI or Forward Search Value Iteration (FSVI) [29] in a similar manner. In particular,
multiple backups can be performed for a single sampled belief point by taking the symmetric image of that sampled belief.
The gist is that, while different value function-based methods provide different sampling approaches, our framework can be
universally applied to enhance the sampling procedure.
4.3. Deﬁnition of symmetries in POSGs
Extending the deﬁnition to POSGs introduces agent-to-agent mappings, where the local actions and observations of an
agent are mapped to those of another agent. Formally, the automorphism for POSGs is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. An automorphism φ for agent i on a POSG is a tuple 〈φI , φS , φ	A, φ	Z 〉 with φ	A = {φAi | i ∈ I} and φ	Z = {φZi | i ∈
I}, where agent mapping φI : I → I , state mapping φS : S → S , action mappings φAi : Ai → AφI (i) , and observation mappings
φZi : Zi → ZφI (i) are all bijections satisfying
T
(
s, 	a, s′)= T (φS(s),φ	A(	a),φS(s′)),
O (s, 	a, 	z) = O (φS(s),φ	A(	a),φ	Z (	z)),
Ri(s, 	a) = RφI (i)
(
φS(s),φ	A(	a)
)
for all s, s′ , 	a, and 	z.
A special case when agent mapping φI is an identity mapping, φ is said to be an intra-agent automorphism. On the
other hand, if φI is a non-identity mapping, it is said to be an inter-agent automorphism. Informally speaking, inter-agent
automorphism allows interchanging agents as long as the local actions and observations are interchanged accordingly. On
the other hand, intra-agent automorphism is conﬁned to interchanging the local actions and observations within an agent.
It can be thought that intra-agent automorphism captures the symmetry present in the single-agent POMDP level, while the
inter-agent automorphism extends the symmetry to the multi-agent level.
To illustrate, we present the decentralized tiger (Dec-Tiger) domain [19]. Dec-Tiger is a multi-agent extension to the
classical tiger domain. There are now two agents, setting the agent set I = {1,2}, that must make a sequence of decisions
as to whether they should open the door (jointly or separately) or listen. The states are the same as the tiger domain: sLEFT
and sRIGHT. Each agent has the same set of actions that are equivalent to the single agent case: {ai,LISTEN,ai,RIGHT,ai,LEFT | i =
1 or 2}, where ai,X indicates the action X of agent i. The observation space is duplicated from the single-agent case as well:
{zi,LEFT, zi,RIGHT | i = 1 or 2}, with the notations deﬁned similarly.
If at least one agent performs an open action, the state resets to either one with 0.5 probability. If both continue with a
listen action, then there is no change of state.
Each agent individually observes the tiger from the correct room with probability 0.85 when performing a listen action.
When both agents perform a joint listen action, then the resulting joint observation probability is computed as a product of
the individual probabilities. All other joint actions where at least one agent performs a non-listen action result in a uniform
distribution over the joint observations.
Rewards are given equally to both agents, and are designed to encourage cooperation. The maximum reward can be
attained by cooperatively opening the tiger-free room. If each agent chooses a different room, then a high penalty is given.
If they cooperatively open the tiger room, then they still suffer a penalty, but at a much lesser cost. Jointly listening costs
a small penalty, whereas opening the tiger-free room while the other agent listens will result in a small reward. If, on the
other hand, one agent opens the tiger room while the other is listening, then they incur the worst possible penalty. The
transition probabilities, observation probabilities, and rewards are summarized in Figs. 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
One possible symmetry that exhibits an inter-agent mapping is presented in Fig. 8. For the complete list of symmetries
in Dec-Tiger, we invite the reader to consult Fig. 15 in Section 7 where we report experimental results.
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{z1,LEFT, z2,LEFT} 0.7225 0.0225
{z1,LEFT, z2,RIGHT} 0.1275 0.1275
{z1,RIGHT, z2,LEFT} 0.1275 0.1275
{z1,RIGHT, z2,RIGHT} 0.0225 0.7225
Fig. 6. Observation probabilities of the Dec-Tiger domain for joint action {a1,LISTEN,a2,LISTEN}. The probabilities for other joint actions are uniform, and are
omitted.
Joint action sLEFT sRIGHT
{a1,RIGHT,a2,RIGHT} 20,20 0,0
{a1,LEFT,a2,LEFT} 0,0 20,20
{a1,RIGHT,a2,LEFT} −100,−100 −100,−100
{a1,LEFT,a2,RIGHT} −100,−100 −100,−100
{a1,LISTEN,a2,LISTEN} −2,−2 −2,−2
{a1,LISTEN,a2,RIGHT} 9,9 −101,−101
{a1,RIGHT,a2,LISTEN} 9,9 −101,−101
{a1,LISTEN,a2,LEFT} −101,−101 9,9
{a1,LEFT,a2,LISTEN} −101,−101 9,9
Fig. 7. Individual rewards of the Dec-Tiger domain.
φI (i) =
{
Agent 2 if i is Agent 1
Agent 1 if i is Agent 2
φS (s) = Identity mapping
φA1 (a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a2,LISTEN if a = a1,LISTEN
a2,RIGHT if a = a1,RIGHT
a2,LEFT if a = a1,LEFT
φA2 (a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a1,LISTEN if a = a2,LISTEN
a1,RIGHT if a = a2,RIGHT
a1,LEFT if a = a2,LEFT
φZ1 (z) =
{
z2,RIGHT if z = z1,LEFT
z2,LEFT if z = z1,RIGHT
φZ2 (z) =
{
z1,RIGHT if z = z2,LEFT
z1,LEFT if z = z2,RIGHT
Fig. 8. An example of an inter-agent symmetry for Dec-Tiger.
4.4. Properties of symmetries in POSGs
As with the case with POMDPs, the symmetries in POSGs reveal useful regularities present in the model. In this section,
we formally state the properties of symmetries in POSGs, which will be used to extend MADP in the later sections. Again,
with a slight abuse of notation, we extend the domain of φ to local and joint policy trees, the output of which is another
policy tree with all the actions and observations permuted accordingly. That is, φ(π) for any policy tree π is a permuted
policy tree whose action nodes have been mapped by πA and the observation edges have been permuted by πZ .
Theorem 3. Given an automorphism φ = 〈φI , φS , φ	A, φ	Z 〉,
V 	πi,t(s) = V φ( 	π)φI (i),t
(
φS(s)
)
for all s at all time steps 1 t  T .
Proof. We prove by induction on t . For t = 1, only the immediate reward matters:
V 	πi,1(s) = Ri(s, 	a) = RφI (i)
(
φS(s),φ	A(	a)
)= V φ( 	π)
φI (i),1
(
φS(s)
)
.
The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the fact that a 1-step policy tree is simply a single action node. The second equality
holds by the deﬁnition of automorphism.
Assume that the theorem holds for all t ’s up to t = k − 1 (i.e. for policy trees of depth k − 1). For t = k, the Bellman
equation unfolds as
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∑
s′∈S,	z∈	Z
T
(
s, 	a, s′)O (s′, 	a, 	z)V 	π(	z)i,k−1(s′)= RφI (i)(φS(s),φ	A(	a))+ γ ∑
φS (s′)∈S
φ	Z (	z)∈	Z
⎛
⎜⎝
T (φS(s),φ	A(	a),φS(s′))
·O (φS(s′),φ	A(	a),φ	Z (	z))
·V φ( 	π(φ	Z (	z)))
φI (i),k−1 (φS(s
′))
⎞
⎟⎠ .
All the terms except the V (·) can be shown equal by the deﬁnition of automorphism. The equality of the next-step value
term is established by the inductive hypothesis, since the subtrees (all of which are (k − 1)-level subtrees) encountered by
following 	z in 	π are symmetric to the ones encountered by following φ	Z (	z) in φ( 	π). Therefore, the equality holds for all
t  1. 
Because Theorem 3 holds for all values of t , we will henceforth drop the horizon superscript t whenever possible.
Based on the above theorem, we can make the following statement regarding very weak dominance under the presence of
symmetries:
Theorem 4. If the local policy π of agent i is very weakly dominated, then the local policy φ(π) of agent φI (i) is also very weakly
dominated for any automorphism φ .
Proof. From Eq. (6), the local policy π of agent i is very weakly dominated if there exists a probability distribution p on
other local policies Πi\π such that∑
π ′∈Πi\π
p
(
π ′
)
V
{π ′, 	π−i}
i (s) V
{π, 	π−i}
i (s), ∀s,∀ 	π−i ∈ 	Π−i .
Consider the local policy φ(π) of agent φI (i). In order to prove that φ(π) is very weakly dominated, we have to show that
there exists a probability distribution p′ on agent φI (i)’s other local policies ΠφI (i)\φ(π) such that∑
π ′′∈ΠφI (i)\φ(π)
p′
(
π ′′
)
V
{π ′′, 	π−φI (i)}
φI (i)
(s) V {φ(π), 	π−φI (i)}
φI (i)
(s), ∀s,∀ 	π−φI (i) ∈ 	Π−φI (i).
Note that the local policy π ′ of agent i corresponds to the local policy φ(π ′) of agent φI (i). Hence for each π ′′ ∈
ΠφI (i)\φ(π), we can always ﬁnd π ′ ∈ Πi\π such that π ′′ = φ(π ′) since φ is bijective. If we set p′(π ′′) = p(π ′) where
π ′′ = φ(π ′), we have found a probability distribution p′ that satisﬁes the above inequality. 
From Theorem 4, it follows that a policy tree and all of its symmetric images can be pruned without loss in the value if
any of them is known to be very weakly dominated:
Corollary 1. If a policy π can be pruned, then φ(π) can be pruned as well.
As in the case of POMDPs, we adopt MADP to demonstrate the usefulness of symmetries in POSGs. While this approach
may seem algorithm-speciﬁc, we argue that the theoretical basis on which such exploitations are made is general enough
to be applied to other algorithms as well.
For example, there has been much signiﬁcant work on solving DEC-POMDPs in recent years, including Bounded Policy
Iteration (BPI) [4], Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming (MBDP) [28], Heuristic Policy Iteration (HPI) [2], Point-Based
Bounded Policy Iteration (PB-BPI) [14], Point-Based Policy Generation (PBPG) [37], Constraint Based Policy Backup (CBPB)
and Team Decision problem based Policy Iteration (TDPI) [15]. These algorithms often share common computational steps,
such as exhaustive or partial dynamic programming backup of policies, pruning dominated policies and improving policies
using mathematical programming. The theoretical results above can be used to reduce the number of policies generated
by the dynamic programming backup, as well as the number of mathematical programs to solve. We can also apply recent
results on exploiting symmetries to reduce the sizes of mathematical programs themselves [5], but the details are left for
future work.
The symmetries also have various impacts on the game theoretic analysis of the given POSG. To facilitate our discussion,
we will convert the given POSG to a normal form game. We will also adhere to the term “policy” for the sake of consistency,
although “strategy” is more widely adopted in game theory. As pointed out by Hansen et al. [11], a POSG at time horizon
t can be converted to a normal form game by enlisting all the policy trees as possible actions. We also include the initial
state distribution in order to have scalar payoffs rather than |S|-dimensional vector payoffs. This is done by taking the inner
product of each value vector V 	πi and the initial state distribution b0. This inner product will become the payoff entry into
our converted game.
We denote the payoff of a joint policy 	π for agent i as ui( 	π), or equivalently, ui({πi, 	π−i}). It follows that ui( 	π) =
uφI (i)(φ( 	π)), due to Eq. (7).∑
b0(s)V
	π
i (s) =
∑
b0
(
φS(s)
)
V φ( 	π)
φI (i)
(
φS(s)
)
. (7)s s
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strategy) Nash equilibrium is a joint policy such that for any ﬁxed agent, that agent has no incentive to unilaterally switch
its policy provided that others do not change theirs.
Proposition 1. If a joint policy 	π is a Nash equilibrium in a normal form representation of the given POSG, then its symmetric image
φ( 	π) also constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Given a Nash equilibrium 	π∗ , the following inequality holds by the deﬁnition:
ui
({
π∗i , 	π∗−i
})
 ui
({
πi, 	π∗−i
})
, ∀i,πi = π∗i .
The automorphism guarantees ui( 	π) = uφI (i)(φ( 	π)), for any joint policy 	π . Therefore, uφI (i)(φ( 	π∗)) uφI (i)({φ(πi),φ( 	π∗−i)}),∀i,πi = π∗i , which establishes the fact that φ( 	π∗) is a Nash equilibrium as well. 
Proposition 1 easily generalizes to mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that our notion of symmetries generalize the
deﬁnition used in classical symmetric games, which requires that there exists an invariant action mapping φA and observation
mapping φZ for all possible permutations of agents. Our theoretical results could be used in making game solvers more
scalable, widening the applicability of the techniques by Cheng et al. [7]. The facts presented in this section lead to a more
eﬃcient procedure for ﬁnding the equilibria of symmetric POSGs. Instead of searching for every single equilibrium present
in POSGs, we can speed up the process by applying the symmetries of the POSGs to the equilibria that have already been
discovered.
The correlated equilibrium (CE) [21] generalizes the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Whereas the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium is deﬁned to be an independent probability over the local policies, the CE is a probability over the joint policies
allowing for the dependencies among agents’ local policies. That is, the probability p over the joint policies is a CE if∑
	π−i
p( 	π)ui( 	π)
∑
	π−i
p( 	π)ui
({
π ′i , 	π−i
})
, ∀i and ∀π ′i = πi . (8)
With symmetries present in the normal form game representation of the POSG, we can prove a symmetric property of a CE.
Proposition 2. Let p be a CE of the normal form representation of a given POSG. Then there exists a (possibly same) CE p′ such that
p′(φ( 	π)) = p( 	π) for any automorphism φ of the given POSG, and any joint policy 	π .
Proof. Given a CE p, we can re-write Eq. (8) as∑
	π−φI (i)
p( 	π)uφI (i)
(
φ( 	π)) ∑
	π−φI (i)
p( 	π)uφI (i)
({
φ
(
π ′i
)
, φ( 	π−i)
})
, ∀i,∀π ′i = πi .
Note that since π ′i = πi , φ(π ′i ) = φ(πi) due to φ being bijective. This modiﬁed form states that p( 	π) can also be used as a
probability with which φ( 	π) is chosen. Therefore, there exists a CE that assigns probability p( 	π) to φ( 	π). 
5. Symmetry discovery in the models
In this section, we show that ﬁnding the symmetries present in POMDPs and POSGs is a graph isomorphism (GI) com-
plete problem, the computational complexity class of ﬁnding the automorphism groups of general graphs. We thus present
the graph encoding of a given POMDP and POSG in order to use a graph automorphism algorithm for ﬁnding symmetries in
the model.
5.1. Graph encoding of a POMDP
We ﬁrst describe how we can cast the problem of ﬁnding automorphisms in POMDPs as that of ﬁnding automorphisms in
graphs. Speciﬁcally, we will show how we can encode a given POMDP as a vertex-colored graph, so that the automorphism
found in the graph corresponds to the automorphism in the POMDP. Our approach here will prove useful when we discuss
the computational complexity of discovering POMDP automorphisms in the later part of this section.
A vertex-colored graph G is speciﬁed by 〈V , E,C,ψ〉, where V denotes the set of vertices, E denotes the set of edges
〈vi, v j〉, C is the set of colors, and ψ : V → C denotes the color associated with each vertex. An automorphism φ : V → V is
a permutation of V with the property that for any edge 〈vi, v j〉 ∈ E , 〈φ(vi),φ(v j)〉 is also in E , and for any vertex vi ∈ V ,
ψ(vi) = ψ(φ(vi)).
We can encode a POMDP as a vertex-colored graph in order to apply graph automorphism algorithms. The encoded
graph is composed of the following classes of vertices and edges, their counts being presented in parentheses:
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• States (|S| vertices): for every state s, we prepare vertex vs and make every vertex share the same unique color: ∀s ∈ S ,
ψ(vs) = cstate.
• Actions (|A| vertices): for every action a, we prepare vertex va and make every vertex share the same unique color:
∀a ∈ A, ψ(va) = caction.
• Next states (|S| vertices and |S| edges): for every state s′ , we prepare vertex vs′ and make every vertex share the same
unique color: ∀s′ ∈ S , ψ(vs′ ) = cstate′ . We connect the next-state vertex vs′ to the state vertex vs if and only if s′ = s.
• Observations (|Z | vertices): for every observation z, we prepare vertex vz and make every vertex share the same unique
color: ∀z ∈ Z , ψ(vz) = cobs.
• Transition probabilities (|S|2|A| vertices and 3|S|2|A| edges): for every triplet (s,a, s′), we prepare vertex vT (s,a,s′) that
represents the transition probability T (s,a, s′) and assign colors so that two vertices share the same color if and only if
the transition probabilities are the same: ∀(s,a, s′), ∀(s′′,a′, s′′′), ψ(vT (s,a,s′)) = ψ(vT (s′′,a′,s′′)) iff T (s,a, s′) = T (s′′,a′, s′′′).
We connect the transition probability vertex vT (s,a,s′) to the corresponding state, action, and next-state vertices, vs, va
and vs′ .
• Observation probabilities (|S||A||Z | vertices and 3|S||A||Z | edges): for every triplet (s,a, z), we prepare vertex vO (s,a,z)
that represents the observation probability O (s,a, z) and assign colors so that two vertices share the same color if
and only if the observation probabilities are the same: ∀(s,a, z), ∀(s′,a′, z′), ψ(vO (s,a,z)) = ψ(vO (s′,a′,z′)) iff O (s,a, z) =
O (s′,a′, z′). We connect the observation probability vertex vO (s,a,z) to the corresponding state, action, and observation
vertices, vs, va and vz .
• Reward function (|S||A| vertices and 2|S||A| edges): for every pair (s,a), we prepare vertex vR(s,a) that represents the
reward R(s,a) and assign colors so that two vertices share the same color if and only if the rewards are the same:
∀(s,a),∀(s′,a′), ψ(vR(s,a)) = ψ(vR(s′,a′)) iff R(s,a) = R(s′,a′). We connect the reward vertex vR(s,a) to the corresponding
state and action vertices, vs and va .
• Initial state distribution (|S| vertices and |S| edges): for every state s, we prepare vertex vb0(s) that represents the
initial state probability b0(s) and assign colors so that two vertices share the same color if and only if the initial state
probabilities are the same: ∀s,∀s′ , ψ(vb0(s)) = ψ(vb0(s′)) iff b0(s) = b0(s′). We connect the initial state probability vertex
vb0(s) to the corresponding state vertex vs .
The graph encoding process is mechanical, and the colors and edges are carefully prepared in order to preserve the equiv-
alence of the model under any graph automorphism. Fig. 9 shows the result of the graph encoding process for the tiger
domain.
The encoded graph is sparse, consisting of O (|S|2|A||Z |) vertices and O (|S|2|A||Z |) edges, hence the number of edges
is linear in the number of vertices. Despite super-polynomial running time in the worst case, typical graph automorphism
solvers are eﬃcient for sparse graphs. As we report in Section 7, we used nauty [18] for the graph automorphism solver,
and it quickly found automorphisms in the encoded graphs of benchmark POMDP domains with up to 6× 107 vertices.
As a minor remark, note that we choose the colors such that ψ(vT (s,a,s′)) = ψ(vO (s,a,z)) even if T (s,a, s′) = O (s,a, z).
This is to prevent the transition probability being permuted with observation probability vertices. Similar restrictions apply
to all other vertices of different classes.
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Similar to the POMDP case, the problem of ﬁnding POSG automorphisms can be reduced to ﬁnding the automorphism
group of a properly encoded graph. The graph encoding we use here is not so much different from the POMDP approach,
with the exception of the vertices that reﬂect the multi-agent aspects.
The encoded graph is composed of the following classes of vertices and their edges:
• Agents (|I| vertices): we prepare one vertex per agent, assigning the same unique color.
• States (|S| vertices): we prepare one vertex per state, assigning the same unique color.
• Next states (|S| vertices and |S| edges): we prepare another vertex per state, assigning the same unique color, however
different from the color of state vertices. We connect each next-state vertex to the corresponding state vertex, so that
permuting state vertices yields permuting next-state vertices in the same order.
• Actions (∑i |Ai| vertices and ∑i |Ai | edges): we prepare one vertex per action, assigning the same unique color. We
connect each action vertex to the corresponding agent vertex to represent to which agent the action is available.
• Observations (∑i |Zi | vertices and ∑i |Zi | edges): we prepare one vertex per observation, assigning the same unique
color. We connect each observation vertex to the corresponding agent vertex to represent to which agent the observation
is available.
• Transition probabilities (|S|2∏i |Ai | vertices and (|I| + 2)|S|2∏i |Ai| edges): we prepare one vertex per transition prob-
ability, assigning the same unique color if and only if they have the same probability. We connect each transition
probability vertex to the corresponding state, next-state, and action vertices.
• Observation probabilities (|S|∏i |Ai ||Zi | vertices and (2|I| + 1)|S|∏i |Ai||Zi | edges): we prepare one vertex per obser-
vation probability, assigning the same color if and only if they have the same probability. We connect each observation
probability vertex to the corresponding state, action, and observation vertices.
• Individual reward functions (|I||S|∏i |Ai | vertices and (|I|+2)|I||S|∏i |Ai | edges): we prepare one vertex per individual
reward, assigning the same color if and only if they have the same reward. We connect each reward vertex to the
corresponding agent, state, and action vertices.
• Initial state distribution (|S| vertices and |S| edges): we prepare the vertices corresponding to vb0(s) the same way as
they are for POMDPs.
The resulting graph has O (|I||S|2∏i |Ai ||Zi |) vertices and O (|I|2|S|2∏i |Ai||Zi |) edges. For DEC-POMDPs where the agents
share the same reward function, there will be O (|I||S|2∏i |Ai ||Zi |) edges so that the number of edges is linear in the
number of vertices.
5.3. Computational complexity
A recent study on the computational complexity of ﬁnding MDP symmetries [20] showed that the problem of ﬁnding the
symmetries of a given MDP can be polynomially reduced to the problem of ﬁnding the automorphisms of the corresponding
graph encoding. Hence, it is known that the computational complexity of ﬁnding the symmetries of an MDP belongs to the
graph isomorphism-complete (GI-complete) class. In this section, we extend the result on MDPs to POMDPs and POSGs,
taking a similar but slightly different approach.
For ease of exposition, we provide two lemmas that will be useful in proving the main theorem regarding the results for
POSGs. We will use the following deﬁnitions for the proof in the ﬁrst lemma:
Deﬁnition 3. Given POSG M , GM denotes the vertex-colored undirected graph representation of M . The model vertices of
GM are the vertices corresponding to the state, action, observation, and agents of M . The parameter vertices of GM are the
ones corresponding to transition, observation, and reward functions of M .
We also adjust notations regarding symmetries in order to prevent confusion: Symmetries pertaining to graphs will be
denoted as φG with a G subscript, whereas symmetries of POSGs will retain the notations introduced in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. A symmetry of M corresponds to a unique automorphism of GM , and vice versa.
Proof. First, assume that a symmetry φ of M is given. From this, we can prove the existence of a unique automorphism φG
of GM . To construct a unique φG from φ, proceed by ﬁrst mapping the model vertices according to φ. For example, given
an action vertex vai , we set φG(vai ) ← vφAφ(i) (aφ(i)) . Note that mapping the agent vertices simultaneously still maintains the
edge connectivity because their corresponding action and observation vertices are mapped accordingly. Next, we permute
the parameter vertices that are connected to the model vertices. This latter permutation must be possible because φ pre-
serves the probabilities and rewards (whose corresponding vertex colors are the same). To specify the permutations of the
parameter vertices, consider a pair of tuples t1 = 〈s, 	a, 	z, s′〉 and t2 = 〈φS (s),φ	A(	a),φ	Z (	z),φS (s′)〉. By construction of GM ,
the vertices vT (s,	a,s′) and vT (φ (s),φ (	a),φ (s′)) , corresponding to T (s, 	a, s′) and T (φS (s),φ	 (	a),φS(s′)), respectively, share theS 	A S A
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of POSG symmetry. The only components connected to the relevant parameter vertices are the participating model vertices.
Therefore, φG(vT (s,	a,s′)) ← vT (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS (s′)) preserves the color and edge constraints of graph automorphism. The same
argument applies to the observation probability and reward vertices, completing the construction of φG . The construction of
φG is tailored to a speciﬁc φ, and is different for some other φ′ = φ, since the POSG symmetries are bijections. Thus, there
is only one φG for a speciﬁc φ.
To show the other direction, assume we are given a φG of GM . Consider two tuples t1 = 〈vs, {vai }, {vzi }, vs′ 〉 and t2 =〈φG(vs), {φG(vai )}, {φG(vzi )}, φG(vs′ )〉. The set of vertices for both tuples run over all agents i ∈ I . The vertices vs, vs′ , {vai } of
t1 are connected to a transition probability vertex vT (s,	a,s′) that corresponds to T (s, 	a, s′), where 	a is the joint action formed
by concatenating the actions corresponding to the vertices {vai }. The analogue holds for another transition probability vertex
vT (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS (s′)) of t2. Because there can be only one vT (s,	a,s′) for the triple (s, 	a, s′), only the vertices in t2 are connected
to vT (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS (s′)) , and no other. It follows that the following two equalities hold:
φG(vT (s,	a,s′)) = vT (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS (s′)),
ψ
(
φG(vT (s,	a,s′))
)= ψ(vT (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS (s′))).
If this were not true, there must exist another vertex vT ′′ that is mapped to vT (s,	a,s′) . Then, by the property of graph auto-
morphism, the corresponding vertices in t2 should also be connected to vT ′′ – otherwise, vertices in t1 cannot be mapped
to those of t2. However, this is a contradiction to the way GM is constructed, since the vertices in t2 are connected to
two transition probability vertices. Therefore, there exists an automorphism φ such that T (s, 	a, s′) = T (φS (s),φ	A(	a),φS(s′)),
where φG(vs) = vφS (s), φG(vai ) = vφ	A(aφI (i)),∀i ∈ I,ai ∈ Ai, s ∈ S . The analogous equalities for the observation and reward
functions can be proved similarly. Furthermore, similar to the proof of the reverse direction, φ is unique to the given φG
because φG is a bijection. 
We also show that, given any vertex-colored undirected graph G , we can construct POSG so that an automorphism of G
corresponds to a unique symmetry of the POSG, and vice versa. The constructed POSG consists of a single agent, action, and
observation. Each state of the POSG corresponds to each vertex of G . In more detail, the construction is as follows: Prepare a
POSG state per each v ∈ V . With a slight abuse of notation, we will use the notations for states and vertices interchangeably.
We take the agent set to be a singleton set. There is only a single action, a, for this POSG, and the transition probabilities
are determined as follows: Let deg(v) denote the degree of vertex v . Then T (v,a,u) = 1deg(v) ,∀(v,u) ∈ E . A self-transition
of probability 1 is implicitly assigned to zero-degree vertices. Therefore, the transition probability assignment will need
O (|V |D) time, where D = maxv∈V deg(v). This complexity is again upper-bounded by O (|V |2), since there can be at most
|V | − 1 edges connected to any given vertex. There is only one observation z, leading to an identical observation probability
function of 1 to all (s,a) pairs. That is, O (v,a, z) = 1, ∀v ∈ V . This assignment is done in O (|V |) time. For the reward
component, we assign the reward according to the color of the vertex at which the action is taken. That is, R(v,a) =
N(ψ(v)), where N : C →  is taken to be any bijection that maps colors to real numbers.
Deﬁnition 4. Given a vertex-colored undirected graph G = 〈V , E,C,ψ〉, MG denotes the POSG representation of G via
construction steps described above.
Lemma 2. An automorphism of MG corresponds to a unique symmetry of M, and vice versa.
Proof. First, we show that there is a unique symmetry φ of MG for an automorphism φG of G . Because the vertices
constitute the state space of MG , only the states are permuted. By the edge-preserving property of φG , deg(v) = deg(φG(v))
for all vertices in G . It follows that T (v,a,u) = T (φG(v),a, φG(u)), ∀(v,u) ∈ E . By the color-preserving property of φG ,
R(v,a) = ψ(v) = ψ(φG(v)) = R(φG(v),a) holds. Lastly, the observation probability remains invariant to any automorphism
since it is constant for all states. Therefore, we can construct φ by permuting the states the way they were permuted by φG .
Notice that because φG(v) = φ′G(v), ∀φ′G = φG , φ is unique.
To prove the other direction, we assume the symmetry φ of MG is given. By deﬁnition of φ, T (s,a, s′) = T (φS (s),a, φS (s′))
and R(s,a) = R(φS (s),a) holds. The equivalence of the transition probabilities implies that deg(vs) = deg(vφ(s)) for the
vertex vs corresponding to state s. This equality holds for all v ∈ V . To this end, we can set φG(vs) ← vφ(s) as our unique φG .
To see that this φG supports edge-preservation, take any (v,u) ∈ E . Let sv and su be the states mapped to v and u,
respectively. Then T (sv ,a, su) = 1deg(v) = 1deg(φG (v)) = T (φ(sv ),a, φ(su)). The fact that the last term is non-zero indicates
that (φG(v),φG(u)) ∈ E as well. Also, for any (v,u) /∈ E , T (sv ,a, su) = T (φG(v),a, φG(u)) = 0, hence (φG(v),φG(u)) /∈ E as
well. 
We now state the main theorem regarding the computational complexity of ﬁnding symmetries of POSGs. We denote
the problem of ﬁnding the generators2 of automorphism groups of a graph G by AGEN(G), and the problem of ﬁnding the
2 Simply put, an automorphism generator of a graph is a set of permutations on the vertices such that when applied, yields permuted graphs.
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fact to prove that the computational complexity of PSYMM(M) is GI-complete as well.
To prove that PSYMM(M) is GI-complete, we need to show that PSYMM(M) p AGEN(GM) and AGEN(G) p
PSYMM(MG), where A p B denotes polynomial reducibility of problem A to problem B .
Theorem 5. PSYMM(M) belongs to the class GI-complete.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that PSYMM(M) p AGEN(GM). The number of vertices in GM is O (|I|2|S|2∏i |Ai ||Zi |), which is
polynomial in the number of agents, states, individual actions, and observations. Since the complexity of constructing any
undirected graph from n vertices is at most O (n2) (in the case of a complete graph), it takes polynomial time to convert
the POSG to the corresponding vertex colored undirected graph. By Lemma 1, the symmetries of M and the automorphisms
of GM are equivalent.
The second part of the proof aims to show that AGEN(G) p PSYMM(MG). For the purpose of parallel argument, we
assume that the given graph is vertex-colored, although the argument can be specialized to non-colored graphs. Given a
vertex-colored undirected graph G = 〈V , E,C,ψ〉, we will construct the corresponding POSG MG . Note that it also takes
polynomial time to convert the graph G to the POSG MG . By Lemma 2, the automorphisms of G and the symmetries of MG
are equivalent. 
By setting |I| = 1, a POSG becomes a POMDP and all of the arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 5 carries over
without modiﬁcation. Hence, we can state the same result for an arbitrary POMDP regarding its computational complexity.
Corollary 2. The problem of ﬁnding the symmetries of a POMDP belongs to the class GI-complete.
Although the class GI-complete belongs to NP, it is neither known to be P nor NP-complete. It is however known to be
in the low hierarchy of class NP, and there are a number of implementations that can solve GI problems eﬃciently.
6. Exploiting symmetries in the solution methods
In this section, we present algorithms for POMDPs and POSGs taking advantage of symmetries present in the model.
We ﬁrst show how we can extend PBVI using the characteristics of POMDP symmetries discussed in Section 4.2. We then
present an extended version of MADP for POSGs using the properties of POSG symmetries discussed in Section 4.4.
6.1. Extending PBVI for symmetry exploitation in POMDPs
With the set of automorphisms Φ that represents the set of all symmetries present in the model, we can modify PBVI
to take advantage of the symmetries in belief states and α-vectors: First, when we sample the set of belief states, one of
the heuristics used by PBVI is to select the belief state with the farthest ‖ · ‖1 distance from any belief state already in B .
Since we readily know the values at symmetric images of any belief state, we modify the ‖ · ‖1 distance computation to
handle symmetries: ‖b−b′‖Φ1 =minφ,φ′∈Φ ‖φ(b)−φ′(b′)‖1. We then select the belief state with the farthest ‖ · ‖Φ1 distance.
This also allows us to exclude symmetrically identical belief states. Second, since B will exclude symmetrically identical
belief states, we should modify the backup operation to include symmetric images of α-vectors into Γ at . Table 3 shows the
pseudo-code for performing the symmetric backup operation.
We also added a small but important improvement for the symmetric backup of α-vectors: some of the belief states
will have the same symmetric image, i.e., b = φ(b). For these belief states, it is often unnecessary to add φ(αb) into Γt ,
since φ(αb) is relevant to the belief state φ(b) but b and φ(b) are the same! We thus identiﬁed which automorphisms yield
b = φ(b) for each belief state b, and included the symmetric images of α-vectors only for these automorphisms.
6.2. Extending MADP for symmetry exploitation in POSGs
We now show how to apply our approach to POSGs. Using the results in Section 4.4, we can expect certain leverages in
performance when using MADP. In particular, we make use of the symmetries in the two stages of the method:
• Value computation stage: The ﬁrst major speed bottleneck occurs during the value computation, where we evaluate
all the joint policies generated from the exhaustive backup. However, Theorem 3 states that for any given joint policy,
its value vector is merely a permutation of the value vector of its symmetric image. Thus, the value computation for
such policies can be avoided – we can simply permute the symmetric value vector whenever we need it. Note that in
the case of inter-agent symmetries, all the value vectors of an agent can be obtained by permuting value vectors of its
symmetric agent. The total number of value vectors decreases by a factor of |Φ|.
• Pruning stage: An even greater slowdown is due to LP routines for pruning. The existence of symmetries allows us to
reduce the number of LP invocations. First, when a local policy π of agent i is pruned, Corollary 1 states that the local
policy φ(π) of agent φI (i) can be pruned for all φ. Second, when π is not to be pruned, then all φ(π)’s are not to be
pruned as well. Therefore, LP need not be performed on those local policies.
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The backup operation of PBVI taking into account Φ , the set of all symmetries.
Require: Γt = backup(B,Γt−1,Φ)
for each a ∈ A, z ∈ Z ,αi ∈ Γt−1 do
for each s ∈ S do
αa,zi (s) = γ
∑
s′∈S T (s,a, s′)O (s′,a, z)αi(s′)
end for
Γ
a,z
t =
⋃
i α
a,z
i
end for
Γt = {}
for each b ∈ B do
for each a ∈ A, s ∈ S do
αab (s) = R(s,a) +
∑
z∈Z argmaxα∈Γ a,zt (α · b)
end for
a∗ = argmaxa(αab · b)
αb = αa∗b
if αb /∈ Γt then
Γt = Γt ∪ αb
for each φ = 〈 f , g,h〉 ∈ Φ do
if f (αb) /∈ Γt then
Γt = Γt ∪ f (αb)
end if
end for
end if
end for
Table 4
Dynamic programming for POSG with symmetries. NoPrunei for each agent i maintains the list of policy trees that are found not prunable by the symmetry.
Require: Sets of t-step policies Πi,t , corresponding value vectors Vi,t for each agent i, and set of symmetries Φ .
# The ﬁrst stage of dynamic programming backup
Perform exhaustive backups to get Πi,t+1 for each i.
for all 	π ∈ 	Πt+1 do
if φ ∈ Φ, V φ( 	π)i,t+1 has been computed then
Compute V 	πi,t+1 (Eq. (5)) and add the value vector to Vi,t+1.
end if
end for
# The second stage of dynamic programming backup
while any agent i has a prunable policy do
NoPrunek ← {}, ∀k ∈ I .
for all π ∈ Πi,t+1 do
if π /∈ NoPrunei and π can be pruned (Eq. (6)) then
Πi,t+1 ← Πi,t+1\π .
for ∀φ ∈ Φ do
ΠφI (i),t+1 ← ΠφI (i),t+1\φ(π).
end for
else if π cannot be pruned then
NoPrunei ← NoPrunei ∪ {π}.
for ∀φ ∈ Φ do
NoPruneφI (i) ← NoPruneφI (i) ∪ {φ(π)}.
end for
end if
end for
end while
return Sets of (t + 1)-step policies Πi,t+1 and corresponding value vectors Vi,t+1 for each agent i
The procedure for the multi-agent dynamic programming operator that exploits symmetry is outlined in Table 4.
7. Experiments
In this section, we empirically show how symmetries in POMDPs and POSGs can help reduce burdens on computational
resources required to compute solutions. The experiments are conducted on a number of standard benchmark domains in
POMDPs and POSGs.
7.1. POMDP experiments
Before we demonstrate the performance gain of the PBVI algorithm by using the symmetric backup operator, we ﬁrst
report test results for the existence of automorphisms in standard POMDP benchmark domains. Most of the benchmark
domains are already compact in the sense that the model minimization algorithm was not able to further reduce the size
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Tiger 2 2 39 0.004 s 2
Tiger-grid 36 35 9814 0.061 s 4
2-City-ticketing (perr = 0) 397 397 1624545 31.872 s 4
2-City-ticketing (perr = 0.1) 397 397 1624545 23.873 s 4
3-City-ticketing (perr = 0) 1945 1945 61123604 2585.770 s 12
3-City-ticketing (perr = 0.1) 1945 1945 61123604 2601.543 s 12
Fig. 10. Model minimization and graph automorphism results on benchmark domains. |S| is the number of states in the original model, Min |S| is the
number of states in the minimized model, |V | is the number of vertices in the graph encoding of the model, and |Φ| is the number of automorphisms
found by nauty including the identity mapping.
Domain Algorithm |B| |Γ | Iter Exec time V (b0) 
Tiger PBVI 19 5 89 0.07 s 6.40 0.01
Symm-PBVI 10 5 89 0.05 s 6.40
Tiger-grid PBVI 590 532 88 359.69 s 0.80 0.03
Symm-PBVI 300 529 85 196.09 s 0.80
2-city-ticketing (perr = 0) PBVI 51 5 167 157.80 s 8.74 0.02
Symm-PBVI 17 5 168 57.60 s 8.74
2-City-ticketing (perr = 0.1) PBVI 104 9 167 546.04 s 7.76 0.02
Symm-PBVI 30 10 167 201.97 s 7.73
3-City-ticketing (perr = 0) PBVI 261 37 91 43094.32 s 8.08 1.00
Symm-PBVI 36 42 91 9395.06 s 8.08
3-City-ticketing (perr = 0.1) PBVI 275 39 91 43286.92 s 6.95 1.00
Symm-PBVI 30 133 91 16791.17 s 6.94
Fig. 11. Performance comparisons of the PBVI algorithm with automorphisms. Symm-PBVI is the PBVI algorithm exploiting the automorphisms, i.e., sym-
metric belief collection and symmetric backup. |B| is the number of belief states given to the algorithms, |Γ | is the number of α-vectors comprising the
policy, Iter is the number of iterations until convergence, V (b0) is the average return of the policy starting from initial belief b0, and  is the convergence
criteria of each algorithm for running until maxb∈B |V (n)(b) − V (n−1)(b)|  . All V (b0)’s are within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the optimal.
in most of the domains. For the tiger-grid domain [16], we were able to reduce the size and ﬁnd symmetries. For the tiger
domain [12], we were not able to reduce the size, but still ﬁnd symmetries.
We further tested for automorphism existence on larger domains. In the spoken dialogue management domain
by Williams et al. [35], the user is trying to buy a ticket to travel from one city to another city, and the machine has
to request or conﬁrm information from the user in order to issue the correct ticket. These dialog management problems
are denoted as n-city-ticketing. In this domain, there are n cities, and a human user is trying to book a ﬂight between
two cities. The agent, as an automated response system, needs to take one of the following actions: greet, ask-from/ask-to,
conf-to-x/conf-from-x, submit-x–y, where x and y are two of the n cities. The user’s response is treated as an observation
for the agent: x, from-x, to-x, from-x-to-y, yes, no, null, where x and y again refer to the cities. The observation function is
dependent on how well the speech recognition model performs. The states are factored into three components:
• Whether the from has been speciﬁed,
• Whether the destination, to, has been speciﬁed,
• Whether the current turn is the ﬁrst turn or not.
We instantiated the domain for n = 2 and n = 3 possible cities, and for two different rates of speech recognition errors perr,
where perr = 0 assumes no speech recognition error and perr = 0.1 assumes an error rate of 10%. Note that even in the case
where perr = 0, the domain is still a POMDP since the user may provide partial information about the request (e.g., origin
city only).
All of these problems could not be reduced in size, but still had symmetries. Regardless of the value of perr, the graphs
encoding the POMDP models were exactly the same. The small differences in the nauty execution times may be due to the
differences in the orderings of the vertices of the graph. Fig. 10 summarizes the result of automorphism ﬁnding experiments.
Next, we experimented with the PBVI algorithms on the above benchmark domains using the discovered automorphisms.
First, we sampled a ﬁxed number of symmetric belief states (e.g., 300 for the tiger-grid) and ran the symmetric version of
PBVI. We then checked the number of unique belief states if the symmetric belief states were to be expanded by the
automorphisms. We set this number (e.g., 590 for the tiger-grid) as the number of belief states to be used by the non-
symmetric version of PBVI, and ran the algorithm in the same setting without automorphisms. Note that our implementation
of PBVI slightly differs from the original version in that the original PBVI interleaves the belief state exploration and the
value iteration, rather than ﬁxing the belief states in the onset of execution. We also gathered the belief states simply
using breadth-ﬁrst traversal instead of stochastic simulation. This was to analyze the eﬃciency of the symmetric backup
isolated from the effects of symmetric belief state exploration. Fig. 11 shows the results of the experiments. In summary,
automorphisms help signiﬁcantly improve the performance of PBVI in running time without sacriﬁcing the quality of policy.
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Fig. 13. Grid-Small3x3 environment.
7.2. POSG experiments
There are no well-known benchmark domains for general POSGs, but there is a wealth of benchmark domains for DEC-
POMDPs. Hence, we report the results on our symmetry exploitation in MADP for DEC-POMDPs only: Dec-Tiger [19], Grid-
Small [1], and Box-Pushing [27]. By focusing on DEC-POMDPs, we can also rule out issues such as equilibrium selection
problem in general-sum games.
The Dec-Tiger domain is a multi-agent extension of the well-known Tiger domain, which has been introduced in Sec-
tion 4.3. The main difference is that the agents suffer less (gain more) by coordinating their actions – e.g., the penalty is
more severe for one agent unilaterally opening the door that leads to the tiger, than for both opening the door to the tiger.
The standard Grid-Small domain is set in a 2-by-2 grid world, where the two agents, i = 1 and i = 2, have to spend as
much time as possible on the same grid cell. There are a total of 16 states (each grid cell either has an agent or not), ﬁve
actions per agent (ai,UP,ai,DOWN,ai,RIGHT,ai,LEFT,ai,STAY), and two observations per agent, denoted zi,LEFT and zi,RIGHT, that
indicate whether the agent senses a wall to its left or right, respectively. The 16 states are encoded as sXY , where X and Y
can take any one of {A, B,C, D} given in Fig. 12. The X indicates the cell in which agent 1 resides, and Y for agent 2, e.g.,
sAD is given in Fig. 12. An extended version of Grid-Small is played in a 3-by-3 grid world. There are a total of 81 states,
where the grid cells can take any one of {A, B,C, D, E, F ,G, H, I}. The action set remains the same as the 2-by-2 case.
There is an additional observation for not sensing a wall on either side, and is denoted as zi,NOTHING for agent i. A visual
representation of the state sAC is given in Fig. 13.
The Box-Pushing domain requires the two agents, i = 1 or 2, to push two small boxes and one large box to a goal
state. The large box is too heavy for a single agent to move, so the two must coordinate their actions in order to
jointly push the large box. There are four actions per robot (ai,LEFT,ai,RIGHT,ai,MOVE,ai,STAY), ﬁve observations per robot
(zi,SMALL, zi,LARGE, zi,WALL, zi,EMPTY, zi,OTHER), and 100 states, four of which are goal states. The robots can either choose to
place the two small boxes individually into the goal state and receive a small reward, or cooperatively push the large box
and receive a greater reward. The initial state of the Box-Pushing domain is depicted in Fig. 14. In this domain, two robots
R1 and R2 start facing each other in a 3-by-4 grid. Notice that the location of R1 is always left to that of R2. This is because,
in order for R1 to be left to R2, it must ﬁrst move upwards. But since both robots have boxes above them, moving upward
will cause the box to be positioned in the goal region, terminating the domain. This also accounts for the fact that the
column coordinates, labeled 0 to 3, suﬃce to describe the positions of R1 and R2, since it is impossible for either robot to
be in the above two rows of the grid without having the domain terminated. Thus, we adopt an alpha-numeric encoding to
denote a particular non-goal state. All non-goal states will be of the form sX XY Y , where the ﬁrst two Xs will be the column
coordinates for R1 and R2 in that order, and the last two Y s take values from {r, l,u,d} indicating the robot is facing right,
left, up, or down, respectively. E.g., s03rl depicts the initial state given in Fig. 14. The four goal states correspond to: the left
small box being in the goal region (sLBox), and the right small box being in the goal region (sRBox), and both small boxes
being in the goal region (sLRBox), and the large box being in the goal region (sLargeBox).
Prior to executing the symmetric MADP algorithm, we ran nauty on the graph encoding of each DEC-POMDP domain.
The automorphisms in Dec-Tiger are presented in Fig. 15. The automorphisms discovered included one trivial automorphism
– the identity mapping. There are three non-trivial automorphisms, two of them being inter-agent. The inter-agent and
intra-agent automorphisms of Grid-Small domain are shown in Figs. 17 and 18, respectively in Appendix A. This domain
contains eight automorphisms, including the identity mapping. Of the seven non-trivial automorphisms, four are inter-
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Symm. type State Action Obs.
Inter-agent Identity mapping a1,LISTEN ↔ a2,LISTEN z0,LEFT ↔ z1,LEFT
a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sLEFT ↔ sRIGHT a1,LISTEN ↔ a2,LISTEN z1,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
a1,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,LEFT
a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,LEFT
Intra-agent sLEFT ↔ sRIGHT a1,LEFT ↔ a1,RIGHT z1,LEFT ↔ z1,RIGHT
a2,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT z2,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
a1,LISTEN ↔ a1,LISTEN
a2,LISTEN ↔ a2,LISTEN
Fig. 15. Non-trivial automorphisms in Dec-Tiger. The notation X ↔ Y indicates that X is symmetric to Y .
Domain Algorithm T = 1 T = 2 T = 3
#LP Time |V| #LP Time |V| #LP Time |V|
Dec-Tiger Symm-MADP 4 1 s 4 42 1 s 207 1022 326 s 86175
MADP 6 0 s 9 84 1 s 810 2371 1215 s 344250
Grid-Small Symm-MADP 2 1 s 1 6 0 s 11 124 24 s 2631
MADP 8 0 s 1 10 1 s 50 410 65 s 20000
Grid-Small3x3 Symm-MADP 1 3 s 1 5 1 s 25 189 172800 s 99809
MADP 4 1 s 1 5 1 s 50 N.A.
Box-Pushing Symm-MADP 10 2 s 8 156 1271 s 768 N.A.
MADP 12 1 s 16 290 3505 s 1536
Fig. 16. Performance comparisons on domains with and without symmetry exploitation. #LP is the number of LP invocations and V is the set of value
vectors produced at the end of each iteration. The ﬁrst row of each domain shows the results with symmetry exploitation and the second row shows the
results without symmetry. All time records are rounded up to the nearest second.
agent. Similarly for Grid-Small3x3, there are seven non-trivial automorphisms. These are shown in Figs. 19 and 21 in the
Appendix A as well. For the Box-Pushing domain, the only non-trivial automorphism is an inter-agent automorphism, as
shown in Fig. 23 in Appendix A. One notable symmetry of this domain is the interchange of the two states indicating the
left and right small boxes being in the goal region (sLBox and sRbox). In addition, the two agents and their corresponding
actions and observations are swapped as well.
After computing the symmetries, we compared our proposed algorithm to the MADP algorithm on each domain. We
measured the memory usage by counting the number of value vectors created at the end of each iteration. We also counted
the number of LP invocations at each horizon. As can be seen in Fig. 16, both algorithms were able to complete three and
two horizons for the former two domains and the Box-Pushing domain, respectively. For the Grid-Small3x3 domain, MADP
could not complete horizon three, whereas Symm-MADP could. The running time for all symmetry-exploiting algorithms
include the time taken to compute the symmetries using nauty, which explains why Symm-MADP takes slightly longer to
complete the ﬁrst time horizon in some cases. A separate ﬁeld for nauty execution time is omitted, as it was negligible (less
than 2.5 s) compared to the overall running time. Notice that even with the exploitation of symmetries, proceeding beyond
the horizon attained by MADP is still spatially constrained. For the Dec-Tiger domain, value vectors alone take 70 GB of
memory by the end of value computation for horizon 4, even with full symmetry exploitation. Such a tendency is due to
the fact that memory usage experiences exponential increase while symmetry only helps by a linear factor at best. However,
this issue can be addressed by various approximate algorithms that bound the memory usage, and experimenting with their
symmetric versions will be left as a future work.
Earlier horizons do not exhibit much of the beneﬁt of the symmetries because very few policy trees are generated.
However, towards the last horizon, we can see the effect of symmetry exploitation. While the number of value vectors
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the execution time do not necessarily follow this trend. This is due to (1) the existence of many self-symmetric policy trees
that do not contribute to multiple removal and LP avoidance, and (2) differing LP sizes, by which the LP solver’s execution
time varies.
The size of LP is an important factor that inﬂuences the execution time. The size is governed by how many policy trees
were created from exhaustive backup and the domain size itself. For example, the Box-Pushing domain utilizes relatively
larger LPs up to 12800 constraints, thereby amplifying the effect of symmetries. Since LP solvers usually take a high-order
polynomial amount of time, reducing a linear number of variables or constraints in LPs will attain super-linear improvement
in time.
Symm. Type State Action Obs.
Inter-agent sAB ↔ sB A a1,UP ↔ a2,UP z1,LEFT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAC ↔ sC A a1,DOWN ↔ a2,DOWN z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAD ↔ sDA a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT
sBC ↔ sC B a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sBD ↔ sDB a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sCD ↔ sDC
sAA ↔ sCC a1,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAB ↔ sDC a1,DOWN ↔ a2,UP z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAD ↔ sBC a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT
sB A ↔ sCD a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sBB ↔ sDD a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sC B ↔ sDA
sAA ↔ sBB a1,UP ↔ a2,UP z1,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sDB a1,DOWN ↔ a2,DOWN z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAD ↔ sC B a1,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sBC ↔ sDA a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,LEFT
sBD ↔ sC A a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sCC ↔ sDD
sAA ↔ sDD a1,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAB ↔ sCD a1,DOWN ↔ a2,UP z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAC ↔ sBD a1,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sB A ↔ sDC a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,LEFT
sBB ↔ sCC a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sC A ↔ sDB
Fig. 17. Non-trivial inter-agent automorphisms in Grid-Small.
Symm. type State Action Obs.
Intra-agent sAA ↔ sCC a1,UP ↔ a1,DOWN Identity mapping
sAB ↔ sCD a2,UP ↔ a2,DOWN
sAC ↔ sC A
sAD ↔ sC B
sB A ↔ sDC
sBB ↔ sDD
sBC ↔ sDA
sBD ↔ sDB
sAA ↔ sBB a1,LEFT ↔ a1,RIGHT z1,LEFT ↔ z1,RIGHT
sAB ↔ sB A a2,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT z2,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sBD
sAD ↔ sBC
sC A ↔ sDB
sC B ↔ sDA
sCC ↔ sDD
sCD ↔ sDC
sAA ↔ sDD a1,UP ↔ a1,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z1,RIGHT
sAB ↔ sDC a2,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z2,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sDB a1,LEFT ↔ a1,RIGHT
sAD ↔ sDA a2,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sB A ↔ sCD
sBB ↔ sCC
sBC ↔ sC B
sBD ↔ sC A
Fig. 18. Non-trivial intra-agent automorphisms in Grid-Small.
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We have presented a graph-theoretical framework for computing and exploiting symmetries for POMDPs and POSGs. In
addition, we have shown in the experiments that the actual running time and space are signiﬁcantly reduced by exploiting
symmetries.
The computation of the symmetries were done by ﬁrst encoding the problems into appropriate graph structures. The
automorphisms of such graphs are then mapped back to the problem domain to represent the symmetries of the problem. In
doing so, we have also provided a theoretical result that relates the computational complexity of symmetry computation to
that of graph isomorphism computation, i.e., the class GI-complete. Additionally, we have extended the concept of symmetry
to a multi-agent setting, introducing POSG symmetries. Because of its multi-agent nature, symmetries in POSGs yield various
Symm. type State Action Obs.
Inter-agent sAB ↔ sB A , sAC ↔ sC A a1,UP ↔ a2,UP z1,LEFT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAD ↔ sDA , sAE ↔ sE A a1,DOWN ↔ a2,DOWN z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAF ↔ sF A , sAG ↔ sG A a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT z1,NOTHING ↔ z2,NOTHING
sAH ↔ sH A , sAI ↔ sI A a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sBC ↔ sC B , sBD ↔ sDB a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sBE ↔ sEB , sBF ↔ sF B
sBG ↔ sGB , sBH ↔ sHB
sB I ↔ sI B , sCD ↔ sDC
sC E ↔ sEC , sC F ↔ sFC
sCG ↔ sGC , sCH ↔ sHC
sC I ↔ sIC , sDE ↔ sED
sDF ↔ sF D , sDG ↔ sGD
sDH ↔ sHD , sDI ↔ sID
sE F ↔ sF E , sEG ↔ sGE
sEH ↔ sHE , sE I ↔ sI E
sFG ↔ sGF , sF H ↔ sH F
sF I ↔ sI F , sGH ↔ sHG
sG I ↔ sIG , sH I ↔ sIH
sAA ↔ sCC , sAB ↔ sBC a1,UP ↔ a2,UP z1,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAD ↔ sFC , sAE ↔ sEC a1,DOWN ↔ a2,DOWN z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAF ↔ sDC , sAG ↔ sIC a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT z1,NOTHING ↔ z2,NOTHING
sAH ↔ sHC , sAI ↔ sGC a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sB A ↔ sC B , sBD ↔ sF B a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sBE ↔ sEB , sBF ↔ sDB
sBG ↔ sI B , sBH ↔ sHB
sB I ↔ sGB , sCD ↔ sF A
sC E ↔ sE A , sC F ↔ sDA
sCG ↔ sI A , sCH ↔ sH A
sC I ↔ sG A , sDD ↔ sF F
sDE ↔ sE F , sDG ↔ sI F
sDH ↔ sH F , sDI ↔ sGF
sED ↔ sF E , sEG ↔ sI E
sEH ↔ sHE , sE I ↔ sGE
sFG ↔ sID , sF H ↔ sHD
sF I ↔ sGD , sGG ↔ sI I
sGH ↔ sH I , sHG ↔ sIH
sAA ↔ sGG , sAB ↔ sHG a1,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAC ↔ sIG , sAD ↔ sDG a1,DOWN ↔ a2,UP z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAE ↔ sEG , sAF ↔ sFG a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT z1,NOTHING ↔ z2,NOTHING
sAH ↔ sBG , sAI ↔ sCG a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sB A ↔ sGH , sBB ↔ sHH a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sBC ↔ sIH , sBD ↔ sDH
sBE ↔ sEH , sBF ↔ sF H
sB I ↔ sCH , sC A ↔ sG I
sC B ↔ sH I , sCC ↔ sI I
sCD ↔ sDI , sC E ↔ sE I
sC F ↔ sF I , sDA ↔ sGD
sDB ↔ sHD , sDC ↔ sID
sDE ↔ sED , sDF ↔ sF D
sE A ↔ sGE , sEB ↔ sHE
sEC ↔ sI E , sE F ↔ sF E
sF A ↔ sGF , sF B ↔ sH F
sFC ↔ sI F , sGB ↔ sH A
sGC ↔ sI A , sHC ↔ sI B
Fig. 19. Non-trivial inter-agent automorphism in Grid-Small3x3.
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of symmetries.
Our algorithms that exploit the symmetries are presented as well. These algorithms are modiﬁcations of previous well-
known algorithms PBVI and MADP for POMDPs and POSGs, respectively. Although we have demonstrated the eﬃciency
of symmetry exploitation only using PBVI and MADP, the idea can be readily extended to other algorithms. For example,
symmetries can have an impact on solution techniques that use heuristic search such as MAA* [33], or Q-value functions for
Symm. type State Action Obs.
Inter (contd.) sAA ↔ sI I , sAB ↔ sH I a1,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sG I , sAD ↔ sF I a1,DOWN ↔ a2,UP z1,RIGHT ↔ z2,LEFT
sAE ↔ sE I , sAF ↔ sDI a1,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT z1,NOTHING ↔ z2,NOTHING
sAG ↔ sC I , sAH ↔ sB I a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,LEFT
sB A ↔ sIH , sBB ↔ sHH a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY
sBC ↔ sGH , sBD ↔ sF H
sBE ↔ sEH , sBF ↔ sDH
sBG ↔ sCH , sC A ↔ sIG
sC B ↔ sHG , sCC ↔ sGG
sCD ↔ sFG , sC E ↔ sEG
sC F ↔ sDG , sDA ↔ sI F
sDB ↔ sH F , sDC ↔ sGF
sDD ↔ sF F , sDE ↔ sE F
sE A ↔ sI E , sEB ↔ sHE
sEC ↔ sGE , sED ↔ sF E
sF A ↔ sID , sF B ↔ sHD
sFC ↔ sGD , sG A ↔ sIC
sGB ↔ sHC , sH A ↔ sI B
Fig. 20. Non-trivial inter-agent automorphism in Grid-Small3x3 (continued).
Symm. type State Action Obs.
Intra-agent sAA ↔ sCC , sAB ↔ sC B a1,LEFT ↔ a1,RIGHT z1,LEFT ↔ z1,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sC A , sAD ↔ sC F a2,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT z2,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAE ↔ sC E , sAF ↔ sCD
sAG ↔ sC I , sAH ↔ sCH
sAI ↔ sCG , sB A ↔ sBC
sBD ↔ sBF , sBG ↔ sB I
sDA ↔ sFC , sDB ↔ sF B
sDC ↔ sF A , sDD ↔ sF F
sDE ↔ sF E , sDF ↔ sF D
sDG ↔ sF I , sDH ↔ sF H
sDI ↔ sFG , sE A ↔ sEC
sED ↔ sE F , sEG ↔ sE I
sG A ↔ sIC , sGB ↔ sI B
sGC ↔ sI A , sGD ↔ sI F
sGE ↔ sI E , sGF ↔ sID
sGG ↔ sI I , sGH ↔ sIH
sG I ↔ sIG , sH A ↔ sHC
sHD ↔ sH F , sHG ↔ sH I
sAA ↔ sGG , sAB ↔ sGH a1,UP ↔ a1,DOWN Identity mapping
sAC ↔ sG I , sAD ↔ sGD a2,UP ↔ a2,DOWN
sAE ↔ sGE , sAF ↔ sGF
sAG ↔ sG A , sAH ↔ sGB
sAI ↔ sGC , sB A ↔ sHG
sBB ↔ sHH , sBC ↔ sH I
sBD ↔ sHD , sBE ↔ sHE
sBF ↔ sH F , sBG ↔ sH A
sBH ↔ sHB , sB I ↔ sHC
sC A ↔ sIG , sC B ↔ sIH
sCC ↔ sI I , sCD ↔ sID
sC E ↔ sI E , sC F ↔ sI F
sCG ↔ sI A , sCH ↔ sI B
sC I ↔ sIC , sDA ↔ sDG
sDB ↔ sDH , sDC ↔ sDI
sE A ↔ sEG , sEB ↔ sEH
sEC ↔ sE I , sF A ↔ sFG
sF B ↔ sF H , sFC ↔ sF I
Fig. 21. Non-trivial intra-agent automorphism in Grid-Small3x3.
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Intra (contd.) sAA ↔ sI I , sAB ↔ sIH a1,UP ↔ a1,DOWN z1,LEFT ↔ z1,RIGHT
sAC ↔ sIG , sAD ↔ sI F a2,UP ↔ a2,DOWN z2,LEFT ↔ z2,RIGHT
sAE ↔ sI E , sAF ↔ sID a1,LEFT ↔ a1,RIGHT
sAG ↔ sIC , sAH ↔ sI B a2,LEFT ↔ a2,RIGHT
sAI ↔ sI A , sB A ↔ sH I
sBB ↔ sHH , sBC ↔ sHG
sBD ↔ sH F , sBE ↔ sHE
sBF ↔ sHD , sBG ↔ sHC
sBH ↔ sHB , sB I ↔ sH A
sC A ↔ sG I , sC B ↔ sGH
sCC ↔ sGG , sCD ↔ sGF
sC E ↔ sGE , sC F ↔ sGD
sCG ↔ sGC , sCH ↔ sGB
sC I ↔ sG A , sDA ↔ sF I
sDB ↔ sF H , sDC ↔ sFG
sDD ↔ sF F , sDE ↔ sF E
sDF ↔ sF D , sDG ↔ sFC
sDH ↔ sF B , sDI ↔ sF A
sE A ↔ sE I , sEB ↔ sEH
sEC ↔ sEG , sED ↔ sE F
Fig. 22. Non-trivial intra-agent automorphism in Grid-Small3x3.
State Action Obs.
sLBox ↔ sRBox, s01uu ↔ s23uu a1,LEFT ↔ a2,LEFT z1,EMPTY ↔ z2,EMPTY
s01ud ↔ s23du , s01ul ↔ s23ru a1,RIGHT ↔ a2,RIGHT z1,OTHER ↔ z2,OTHER
s01ur ↔ s23lu , s01du ↔ s23ud a1,MOVE ↔ a2,MOVE z1,SMALL ↔ z2,SMALL
s01dd ↔ s23dd, s01dl ↔ s23rd a1,STAY ↔ a2,STAY z1,LARGE ↔ z2,LARGE
s01dr ↔ s23ld, s01lu ↔ s23ur
s01ld ↔ s23dr , s01ll ↔ s23rr
s01lr ↔ s23lr , s01ru ↔ s23ul
s01rd ↔ s23dl, s01rl ↔ s23rl
s01rr ↔ s23ll, s02uu ↔ s13uu
s02ud ↔ s13du , s02ul ↔ s13ru
s02ur ↔ s13lu , s02du ↔ s13ud
s02dd ↔ s13dd, s02dl ↔ s13rd
s02dr ↔ s13ld, s02lu ↔ s13ur
s02ld ↔ s13dr , s02ll ↔ s13rr
s02lr ↔ s13lr , s02ru ↔ s13ul
s02rd ↔ s13dl, s02rl ↔ s13rl
s02rr ↔ s13ll, s03ud ↔ s03du
s03ul ↔ s03ru , s03ur ↔ s03lu
s03dl ↔ s03rd, s03dr ↔ s03ld
s03ll ↔ s03rr , s12ud ↔ s12du
s12ul ↔ s12ru , s12ur ↔ s12lu
s12dl ↔ s12rd, s12dr ↔ s12ld
s12ll ↔ s12rr
Fig. 23. Non-trivial automorphism in Box-Pushing. It is an inter-agent automorphism.
DEC-POMDPs [22]. Another interesting area of application would be to apply symmetries to a ﬁnite controller representation
of policies [1].
While symmetry exploitation greatly reduces computational and spatial burden on solving POMDPs and POSGs, it is
limited by the fact that not all problems come with symmetries. One promising direction of research would be to compute
approximate symmetries, along with the theoretical error bound.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Figs. 17–23 show the automorphisms in Grid-Small, Grid-Small3x3, and Box-Pushing, accompanying the results in the
experiments section.
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